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ABSTRACT 
What happens if one applies the “evaluation methodology” of Theo Kuipers to 
inconsistent theories? What happens if one applies the “problem solving 
methodology” of Larry Laudan to inconsistent theories?  We argue that in both 
cases something unacceptable happens. We show that application of Kuipers‟ 
methodology to inconsistent theories leads to a methodological stalemate: 
inconsistent theories are incomparable to consistent ones. Then we show that 
according to Laudan‟s methodology inconsistent theories are always better than 
consistent ones. Finally, we offer partial solutions to these problems. 
1. Introduction 
This papers deals with two questions: 
 
                                                     
1 A previous version of this paper was presented at the VlaPoLo8 workshop 
(Zielona Gora, 20-22/11/03). We thank the audience at LRR10, Bert 
Leuridan,Theo Kuipers and the two referees for their comments on previous 
versions of this paper. 
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(1) What happens if one applies the “evaluation methodology” of 
Theo Kuipers to inconsistent theories? 
(2) What happens if one applies the “problem solving methodology” 
of Larry Laudan to inconsistent theories? 
Both are “methodologies” in the sense of sets of rules for choosing 
between competing theories. We will argue that in both cases something 
unacceptable happens. More precisely we will show that application of 
Kuipers‟ methodology to inconsistent theories leads to a methodological 
stalemate: inconsistent theories are incomparable to consistent ones. And 
we will also show that according to Laudan‟s methodology inconsistent 
theories are always better than consistent ones. 
The structure of this paper is as follows. In Section 2 we present the 
methodology of Kuipers. In Section 3 we show that there is a problem of 
incomparability. In Section 4 we present Laudan‟s proposal, followed by 
an explanation of its problem in Section 5. In Sections 6 and 7 we offer a 
partial solution for both problems. 
2. The evaluation methodology of 
Theo Kuipers 
Kuipers presents an “instrumentalist methodology” or “evaluation 
methodology”, which he offers as a technical, albeit free, explication of 
Laudan‟s problem-solving methodology (Kuipers 2000, p. 115). A good 
starting point is Kuipers‟ definition of “more successful than”: 
Theory Y is (at time t) more successful than theory X iff 
(at t): 
(i) the set of individual problems of Y forms a subset of 
that of X, 
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(ii) the set of general successes of X forms a subset of that 
of Y, and 
(iii) in at least one case the relevant subset is a proper 
subset. (cfr. 2000, p. 112) 
The set of individual problems of a theory are the empirically established 
counterexamples of any empirical law following from the theory, and the 
general successes are all empirically validated laws that are derivable 
from the theory.  
The fact that Y is more successful than X at t is not a sufficient reason 
to prefer Y. But it suggests a stronger hypothesis (2000, p. 113): 
CSH  Y (is and) will remain more successful than X. 
This comparative success hypothesis amounts to two components: 
CSH-P All individual problems of Y are individual problems 
of X. 
CSH-S All general successes of X are general successes of 
Y. 
The hypothesis that Y is more successful than X thus can be falsified by 
finding a counterexample to Y that is not a counterexample to X, or an 
established empirical law which follows from X but is not derivable from 
Y. Unsuccessful attempts to falsify the subhypotheses increase the 
registered success difference and confirm CSH. 
The last step is to formulate a rule of theory selection, called the rule 
of success (2000, p. 114): 
RS When Y has so far proven to be more successful than 
X, i.e., when CSH has been „sufficiently confirmed‟ 
to be accepted as true, eliminate X in favor of Y, at 
least for the time being.   
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The most important consequence of this instrumentalist methodology is 
that falsified theories need not be abandoned, as long as they are more 
successful than all competitors. The model‟s core notion is evaluation, 
not falsification. At a given time, theories known to be false can be the 
best we can get, but as long as successive theories are empirically 
progressing (having less counterexamples and/or more established 
empirical laws) it is rational to prefer them. 
3. Application of Kuipers’ 
methodology to inconsistent 
theories 
It seems fair to assume that Kuipers has classical logic (CL) in mind 
when he talks about “derivations” and “derivability”.2 On this 
assumption, Kuipers‟ notion of general success can be expressed as 
follows: 
An established law L counts as a general success of theory 
T if and only if L is CL-derivable from T. 
 
                                                     
2 This assumption can be justified in two ways. First, Kuipers speaks about 
“logical entailment” as if there is only one logic. People who do this usually have 
CL in mind. Second, he explicitly states that his system is based on the rules MP 
(modus ponens) and MT (modus tollens). Paraconsistent logics (the non-classical 
logics that were devised to handle inconsistencies) do not validate MT. 
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Since in CL inconsistent theories are trivial (A, ¬A ├ B for any B), this 
definition entails that any established law L is a success of an inconsistent 
theory. If Y is inconsistent and X consistent, we will always have that: 
All general successes of X are general successes of Y. 
The reason is simple: every established law that follows from X also 
follows from Y. 
The notion of individual problem can be rephrased as: 
A law that is CL-derivable from theory T counts as an 
individual problem for T if and only there is an empirically 
established counterexample to that law. 
Now consider a law L that is an empirical problem for a consistent theory 
X. This law is also a problem for any inconsistent theory Y (because it is 
also derivable from Y and the counterexamples to L remain). This means 
that, if Y is inconsistent and X consistent, we will always have that: 
All individual problems of X are individual problems of Y. 
Taking our two results together we have the following: if we compare a 
consistent theory with an inconsistent one, the inconsistent one will have 
more successes, but also more problems. CSH can never hold, because its 
two components pull in opposite directions. This methodological 
incomparability cannot be tolerated by Kuipers: though inconsistent 
theories can safely considered to be false (unless we assume that the 
world is inconsistent) they might be closer to the truth than consistent 
ones. So Kuipers‟ ideal of truth approximation implies that we should be 
able to compare consistent theories with inconsistent ones. 
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4. The problem solving 
methodology of Larry Laudan 
The instrumentalist idea of success which we found in the proposal of 
Kuipers is also clearly present in Laudan‟s methodology: 
Given that the aim of science is problem solving .... 
progress can occur if and only if the succession of 
scientific theories in any domain shows an increasing 
degree of problem solving effectiveness. Localizing the 
notion of progress to specific situations rather than to large 
stretches of time, we can say that any time we modify a 
theory or replace it by another theory, that change is 
progressive if and only if the later version is a more 
effective problem solver (in the sense just defined) than its 
predecessor (1977, p. 68) 
Problem solving effectiveness is defined as follows: 
[T]he overall problem solving effectiveness is determined 
by assessing the number and importance of the empirical 
problems which the theory solves and deducting therefrom 
the number and  importance of the anomalies and 
conceptual problems which the theory generates. (1977, p. 
68) 
Laudan‟s definition of what it means for a theory to solve an empirical 
problem, is equivalent to Kuipers‟ definition of successes of a theory: 
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Generally, any theory, T, can be regarded as having solved 
an empirical problem, if T functions (significantly) in any 
schema of inference whose conclusion is a statement of the 
problem. (1977, p. 25) 
Anomalies are defined as follows: 
Whenever an empirical problem, p, has been solved by any 
theory, then p thereafter constitutes an anomaly for every 
theory in the relevant domain which does not solve p. 
(1977, p. 29) 
This definition entails that inconsistencies with observational results are 
not the only form of anomalies: 
One of the most important species of anomaly arises when 
a theory, although not inconsistent with observational 
results, is nonetheless incapable of explaining or solving 
those results (which have been solved by a competitor 
theory). (1977, p. 29) 
In the other direction, not all inconsistencies with observational results 
are anomalies: 
In stressing that a problem can only count as anomalous 
for one theory if it is solved by another, the analysis seems 
to run against the common view that one sort of anomaly, 
the refuting instance, poses a direct cognitive threat to a 
theory, even if it is unsolved by any competitor. (1977, p. 
30) 
Anomalies require a rival theory which solves the problem. As a 
consequence, a refuting instance is not automatically an anomaly. 
Therefore, anomalies should not be confused with Kuipers‟ individual 
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problems (which are defined as refuting instances). The fact that Laudan 
uses anomalies instead of refuting instances is important for the way in 
which his methodology deals with inconsistent theories (see Section 5). 
Let us now look at conceptual problems. Laudan gives the following 
characterization: 
If empirical problems are first order questions about the 
substantive entities in some domain, conceptual problems 
are higher order questions about the well-foundedness of 
the conceptual structures (e.g., theories) which have been 
devised to answer the first order questions. (1977, p. 48) 
Some of the examples he cites are the inconsistency of theories, their 
being rendered implausible by other accepted theories, and their 
incompatibility with prevailing worldviews. Laudan urges us to take 
serious the significance of conceptual problems for evaluating theories. 
Kuipers‟ instrumentalist methodology is clearly limited to empirical 
problems and successes. If there is room for conceptual problems in the 
evaluation of theories, this is only on a second-order level. As Kuipers‟ 
discussion of the importance of simplicity shows, such a criterion can 
only be rationally applied when choosing between theories equally 
successful at the empirical level.3 Nevertheless, Kuipers also makes room 
for a more long-term dimension in evaluating theories, a dimension in 
which seemingly more conceptual factors come into play, as when he 
states that it is possible to evaluate vocabularies in which theories are 
stated. However, such an evaluation is still driven by the empirical 
successes and failures of the theories expressed in these vocabularies. 
 
                                                     
3 Kuipers 2000, p. 120. Notice that in such a conception no disputable weighing 
between empirical and conceptual problems needs to be performed. 
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5. Application of Laudan’s 
methodology to inconsistent 
theories 
If we assume that Laudan has CL in mind (as he indicates himself - see 
the following quote), then his definition of problem solving amounts to: 
A theory T solves a problem L if and only if L is CL-
derivable from it. 
According to this definition, inconsistent theories solve all empirical 
problems. Laudan‟s solution is to put an a priori ban on inconsistent 
theories. 
Unless the proponents of such [i.e. inconsistent] theories 
are prepared to abandon the rules of logical inference 
(which provided the groundwork for recognizing the 
inconsistency), or can somehow “localize” the 
inconsistency, the only conceivable response to a 
conceptual problem of this kind is to refuse to accept the 
offending theory until the inconsistency is removed. (1977, 
p. 49)  
This a priori ban on accepting inconsistent theories is at odds with 
Laudan‟s pragmatist perspective, since he explicitly refuses to ground 
acceptance in considerations of truth. An inconsistent theory is false 
(assuming that the world is consistent) but that does not entail that it 
cannot be a good problem solver. So there is no justification for this a 
priori ban. Moreover, if inconsistent theories were out of the acceptance-
game, it becomes vacuous to claim, as Laudan does, that inconsistency 
counts as a conceptual problem (none of the theories considered will have 
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this kind of conceptual problem). So the a priori ban is not a good 
solution. Laudan has to admit inconsistent theories as competitors, and 
once they are allowed they win automatically: they solve all empirical 
problems and they cannot have anomalies so they wipe out the rivalising 
consistent theories. 
 Before we offer solutions for the problems, it is useful to point out 
that the problem which Laudan faces is different than the problem for 
Kuipers because Laudan uses anomalies rather than refuting instances as 
elements that plead against a theory. Given that an inconsistent theory 
always has an infinite number of refuting instances, Kuipers‟ choice 
creates the incomparability problem explained in Section 3. And given 
that an inconsistent theory cannot have any anomalies (because it 
explains everything) Laudan‟s choice entails that inconsistent theories 
always win. Thus this choice determines how the methodologies deal 
with inconsistent theories and explains why they have different problems. 
6. A solution for Kuipers 
In the philosophy of science, the term theory is used to refer to 
intellectual products of very different size. Newtonian mechanics is often 
called a theory, but it is also very common to speak of the (Newtonian) 
theory of free falling bodies, the (Newtonian) theory of bodies falling in a 
fluid, the (Newtonian) theory of harmonic oscillators, the (Newtonian) 
theory of bodies on an inclined plane, etc. Likewise, we have Mendelian 
genetics (also often called a theory) versus the (Mendelian) theories of 
the height of pea plants, of the colour of the flowers of pea plants, of the 
colour of human eyes, of the human ABO blood group system, etc. One 
way out of this terminological confusion is to call only the big entities 
“theory” and find a different name (e.g. “theory-element”) for the small 
ones. Another solution is to call the big entities “theory-complexes”, and 
to reserve the term “theory” for the small ones. Kuipers chooses the first 
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option. This is clear from a list of examples of theories, which he gives in 
his 2001 (pp. 40-41). His list contains a.o.: Newton‟s theory of 
gravitation, the kinetic theory of gases, Bohr‟s theory of the internal 
structure of the atom, Mendelian genetics and rational-choice theory. 
Kuipers uses the term “specific theory” for small theories. We will also 
take the first option but will use the term “theory-element” for denoting 
small theories. 
The problem that Kuipers faces can be solved by introducing the idea 
of a theory-element in his definitions. Before we can do this, a second 
terminological distinction must be made. Kuipers says: 
Recall, finally, that the principles of a theory, whether 
ontologically and/or epistemologically stratified or not, can 
frequently be distinguished in main or generic principles, 
claimed to be true for the whole domain concerned, and 
special principles, only claimed to be true for a certain 
subdomain. (2001, p. 317) 
We will call the set of generic principles the core of theory. A theory-
element contains the core of the theory and some special principles.4 
We can now formulate the following definition, as a possible solution 
to Kuipers‟ problem: 
A law Lx counts as a general success for a theory T if and 
only if there is a consistent theory-element Tx from which 
Lx is CL-derivable. 
 
 
                                                     
4 The distinctions that we and Kuipers make are inspired by the 
structuralist approach to theories (Balzer, Moulines & Sneed, 1987). 
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Tx contains the core of T and some special principles. This definition 
does not solve the problem: it only excludes theories with an inconsistent 
core. If the inconsistency results from contradictory special principles 
(i.e. if the special principles of one element contradict those of another 
element) this definition makes no difference.  
A second possible definition using the new terminology is: 
A law Lx counts as a general success of a theory T if and 
only if: 
(i) there is a consistent theory-element Tx from which Lx is 
CL-derivable, and 
(ii) T as whole is also consistent. 
This definition entails that inconsistent theories are worthless, which is 
also unacceptable: it turns inconsistency into an all-overriding 
epistemological drawback. 
A third possible definition is: 
A law Lx counts as a general success of a theory T if and 
only if: 
(i) there is a consistent theory-element Tx from which Lx is 
CL-derivable, and 
(ii) Tx is compatible with every single other theory-element 
of T. 
This last definition is the most appropriate one. We will show this by 
means of a formal example. The empirically validated laws we consider 
are: 
(x)(Cx → Ex) 
(x)((¬Cx  Dx) → Ex) 
(x)((¬Cx  ¬Dx) → ¬Ex) 
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We consider theories with a simple core: 
(x)(Ax ↔ Bx) 
We first consider a theory with two theory-elements: 
 
Theory-element 1 
(x)(Ax ↔ Bx) (x)(Cx → Ax)    (x)(Bx → Ex) 
Theory-element 2 
(x)(Ax ↔ Bx) (x)((¬Cx  Dx) → Ax)  (x)(Bx → Ex) 
The theory consisting of these two elements has two successes (the first 
two empirical laws) and no problems (according to all three definitions 
above). Next, we consider two ways to extend this theory. The first is to 
add a third theory-element which preserves consistency of the theory as a 
whole: 
 
Theory-element 3 
(x)(Ax ↔ Bx) (x)((¬Cx  ¬Dx) → ¬Ax)   
(x)(¬Bx → ¬Ex) 
The resulting theory has three successes (again, according to all three 
definitions above). 
Our second extension is one that makes the theory as a whole 
inconsistent (if we assume that (x)(¬Cx  Dx)): 
 
Theory-element 3' 
(x)(Ax ↔ Bx) (x)(¬Cx → ¬Ax)  (x)(¬Bx → ¬Ex) 
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According to the first definition the resulting theory is as good as the first 
extension: three successes, no problems. This shows that the first 
definition does not adequately handle inconsistencies. Inconsistencies are 
an epistemic drawback which should lead us to prefer the first extension 
above the second one. The first definition does not imply such a 
preference. According to the second definition, the second (inconsistent) 
extension is completely worthless. The third definition results in a verdict 
somewhere in between because it separates the problematic from the 
unproblematic theory-elements. According to this definition the 
inconsistent theory has one success (the first empirical law: theory-
element 1 is consistent with the two other theory-elements taken 
separately). The two other laws do not count as successes, because the 
relevant theory-elements are mutually inconsistent (the second empirical 
law does not count as a success because theory-element 2 is incompatible 
with theory-element 3'; analogously for the third empirical law). In other 
words: the second extension results in a less good theory, but this theory 
is not completely worthless. 
In order to make the solution complete we also need a new definition 
of the notion of individual problem: 
A law counts as an individual problem for T if and only 
there is an empirically established counterexample to that 
law and T contains a consistent theory-element from which 
L is CL-derivable. 
This definition does not show up in our example because we assumed 
that the laws are true. In general, we need it to prevent inconsistent 
theories from always having more problems than consistent ones.  
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7. A solution for Laudan’s 
problem 
With the aid of the terminology introduced in the previous section, we 
can formulate the following definition: 
A theory T solves a problem Lx if and only if there is a 
consistent theory-element Tx from which Lx is CL-
derivable. 
This definition fails for similar reasons as the analogous definition in 
Section 6: it only excludes theories with inconsistent cores. 
A second possible definition is: 
A theory T solves a problem Lx if and only if: 
(i) there is a consistent theory-element Tx from which Lx is 
CL-derivable, and 
(ii) T is consistent. 
This definition deprives inconsistent theories from any problem solving 
power. As we have argued in Section 5, this is not acceptable given 
Laudan‟s general ideas. 
A third possible definition is: 
A theory T solves a problem Lx if and only if: 
(i) there is a consistent theory-element Tx from which Lx is 
CL-derivable, and 
(ii) Tx is compatible with every single other theory-element 
of T. 
We can again use the example of Section 6 to discuss the adequacy of 
these definitions. According to the first definition, the second extension is 
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as good as the first one, at least if we look at the capacity to solve 
empirical problems: three empirical problems solved, no anomalies. At 
first sight this definition cannot adequately handle inconsistencies. But it 
does what Laudan suggests in the quote above: it “localizes” 
inconsistencies. By introducing the concept of theory-element and 
requiring that theory-elements are consistent, the inconsistencies become 
clearly identifiable problems: mutual inconsistencies between the special 
principles of different theory-elements. If we adopt this definition, we can 
count these localised inconsistencies among the conceptual problems to 
be weighed and summed with all other problems. The result of this will 
be that (ceteris paribus) the first extension will be preferred because it has 
less internal conceptual problems. 
According to the second definition, the second extension is completely 
worthless. So it is not adequate. According to the third definition, the 
inconsistent extension solves one problem and has two anomalies. The 
first extension is better: three solved problems, no anomalies. If we 
compare it with the two extensions, the original theory has two solved 
problems and anomaly. So it is better than the inconsistent extension.5 
The third definition handles inconsistencies in a different way than the 
first definition: the presence of inconsistencies reduces the capacity of 
theory to solve empirical problems. The advantage of this is that the 
problem of weighing conceptual and empirical problems is partially 
eliminated, because inconsistencies are no conceptual problems anymore. 
They influence our judgment about the value of a theory in a different 
way. 
 
                                                     
5 If we disregard the first extension and compare the original theory with the 
inconsistent extension, the verdict is that this extension is not progressive: the 
original theory then has two solved problems and no anomalies. The inconsistent 
extension has one solved problem and one anomaly. 
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8. Conclusion 
We have argued that Kuipers‟ evaluation methodology and Laudan‟s 
problem-solving methodology run into problems if applied to inconsistent 
theories. The solutions we have offered are based on the distinction 
between (large, overarching) theories and theory-elements. Once we have 
introduced this distinction, it becomes possible to reformulate the core 
concepts of Laudan and Kuipers in such a way that the problems are 
solved. 
We have to insist, however, that our solutions are partial: they can 
only be applied when the core of the theory is consistent, because 
otherwise the theory-elements cannot be consistent. For theories with 
inconsistent cores presumably paraconsistent logics will have to be 
invoked. 
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